LONDON: The phone-hacking scandal that shook Rupert Murdoch’s global media empire and hit the heart of the British government began quietly on a Monday in 2005, when aides to the British royal family gathered in a palace office to air suspicions that their voicemail messages had been intercepted.
Seven years and dozens of arrests later, the day after the latest criminal charges were brought, information from the police, prosecutors and investigators indicated on Wednesday that the investigations are likely to go on for years, with no obvious end in sight.
The Age reports that Rose Ashton-Weir, an 18-year-old in the first year of an arts and sciences degree at the University of Sydney, left Geelong Grammar School in 2009 and completed her schooling at TAFE in Sydney.
Her final marks were not good enough to do law at Sydney University and she is now seeking compensation in the Victorian Civil Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).
According to The Age, she told VCAT this week that while at Geelong Grammar: “I didn’t ever feel I was getting the support I needed to really excel.”
In particular, Ashton-Weir said she struggled at Maths (Folklaw hears ya), and said her English marks suffered after she was criticised for using “long words”.
The school countered that she was poorly organised, had been placed on an “internal suspension” on more than one occasion and had skipped class.
Where children cannot swear an oath to give evidence truthfully (because, for example, they are too young to understand the significance of the oath) there remains a process by which the child can give un-sworn evidence at trial. That process is governed by section 13 of the Evidence Act.
In subsection 5 of section 13, it is a requirement that a person who cannot give sworn evidence will only be allowed to give unsworn evidence if the court has told that person:
(a) that it is important to tell the truth, and
(b) that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs, and
(c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue.
In the recent case of SH v R  NSWCCA 79, the Court dealt with a case in which the principal witness for the prosecution was a complainant who did not give sworn evidence, but gave evidence un-sworn. The appellant said that the judge failed to give a necessary instruction to the complainant before she gave her evidence. As a result, her evidence not merely inadmissible, but also she was an incompetent witness. In such circumstances, it was submitted, the conviction must be set aside despite the fact that no objection was taken on that ground to her giving evidence, and that there may have been no substantial miscarriage of justice.
After reviewing a number of authorities, the Court concluded that while there appeared to be no substantial miscarriage of justice, the failure to comply with section 13(5) meant that the trial was not conducted according to law and that as a result the conviction would have to be set aside [per Basten JA at 35 with Blanche and Hall JJ agreeing].
The approach of the NSWCCA is consistent with the rule in R v BBR  QCA 178 (19 June 2009) where Chesterman JA said:
“[The] proposition is that where a statute permits the giving of unsworn testimony on certain conditions those conditions must be satisfied before the evidence can be given. Where a condition is that the judge give an explanation or admonition of some kind to the witness the explanation or admonition must be given.”
A provision of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act allows a court, when sentencing to goal a juvenile for an offence, to order that the child serve that sentence in Juvenile Detention Centre and not adult custody (section 19). The power to do that only comes into effect when the sentence that is imposed will see the child turn 18 while in custody. In such a circumstance, the court can order that the child serve that portion of his/her sentence over the age of 18 in a juvenile detention facility.
However there are restrictions on that power and one of these is that the sentence must, in any event, end within six months of the child/adult’s 21st birthday (Section 19(2)).
In the recent case of JM v R  NSWCCA 83, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered a situation where a juvenile had been sentenced in such a way that he would be eligible for release when he was 23 years old – well after his twenty-first birthday and the six month maximum time period that is allowed for ordering such a person to serve the sentence in juvenile detention and avoid adult gaol.
The question was whether or not it is relevant to consider that the child will serve time in adult gaol when determining the appropriate sentence? The answer seems to be “yes”. Simpson J observed this [at 123-125]:
“However, it is also my opinion that the constraint imposed by these subsections that makes it inevitable that the applicant will serve the major part of his non-parole period in an adult facility is a consideration relevant to the determination of the length of the non-parole period to be imposed. In saying this, I have not overlooked, and am indeed conscious of, subs (4A), which requires that more than mere youth is essential for a decision that would enable a juvenile offender who attains adulthood during the term of the sentence to serve that sentence as a juvenile offender.
It is then necessary to consider whether it was an error for her Honour to fail to take into account the circumstance that the legislation precluded the course that she envisaged (even though it was plain that she was aware that some part of the sentence would be served in adult custody); and the more difficult question whether it would have been open to her to tailor the sentence to take account of, and avoid, that circumstance.
I have concluded that the first part of the question ought to be answered affirmatively, that it was an error to fail to take into account that circumstance.
The second part of the question (can the court tailor the sentence specifically for the purpose of imposing a sentence that will involve no time in adult custody) has to be answered with very considerably more caution. As Howie J said in TG, it would be an error for the court to select a sentence solely for the purpose of avoiding a period in adult custody. Whatever sentence is imposed, wherever it is to be served, must meet the prime sentencing objective of recognising the objective gravity of the crime. If that is achieved, however, I am of the view, consistently with the approach taken in respect of sentences served in protective custody, that some, although limited, weight can be given to the nature of the offender’s custody.”
The other two justices disagreed with this approach noting that it ought never occur that a sentencing court adjusts a sentence to achieve a particular custodial outcome [per Howie J in TG and as set out in the reasons of Whealy J].
Although in the minority on this point, it seems the judgement of Simpson J has some work to do, particularly in the courts that regularly sentence juveniles. Simpson J’s judgement is typically careful and thorough and addresses the tension that might be observed to exist with the comments of Howie J in TG (as set out above). This is an important case.
At the end of a trial in the District or Supreme Court, after each party has addressed the jury, it falls to the Judge to provide a summary of the evidence. Precisely what the summary should be has been the subject of instruction in the case of R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLOR 91 per Hunt, Enderby and Sharpe JJ:
“A summing-up should, in every case, not only include directions as to the ingredients of the offence which the Crown has to establish and an explanation of how the relevant law may be applied to the facts of the particular case, but it should also include a collected resume of the evidence which relates to each of those ingredients and a brief outline of the arguments which have been put in relation to that evidence [….]”
After critically observing the tendency of trial judges not to comply with such a rule, their honours noted this:
“It is not a compliance with that rule simply to read the relevant part of the section to the jury and then to read out the evidence which has been given chronologically, starting with the first witness and going through the evidence in chief, the cross-examination and then re-examination of each witness before turning to the next witness and so on. The idea of a summing-up is to present for the jury the issues of fact which they have to determine.”
This approach was approved in R v Tillott (NSWCCA, 8 April 1991, unreported).
Following those cases, the NSW Parliament ammended the legislation to provide that a trial judge need not summarise the evidence given in the trial if of the opinion that a summary is not necessary (Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act).
The recent case of Buckley v R; R v Buckley  NSWCCA 85 affirms the good sense of the rule in Zorad while noting that, in some circumstances, it will be right for a judge not to summarise the evidence:
“It is easy to state the basic requirements of a proper summing up: it is less easy to apply them in particular cases. Especially in times where every word uttered in the course of a trial is recorded and transcribed, there is considerable pressure on a trial judge to err on the side of excessive caution in referring to the evidence and the issues, lest any misstatement or omission be seized upon by counsel for the purposes of an appeal. The safest course, it may be thought, is to deal with the evidence as it has unfolded, in a largely chronological fashion. Unfortunately, that course is likely to be of less help to the jury than the more demanding course of identifying issues in dispute and relating relevant evidence to each issue in turn. It is clear that it is the latter course which must generally be adopted.” [per Basten JA at 14].
The court has also noted with approval the recent judgement of El-Jalkh v R  NSWCCA 139 James J (Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing), where (after referring to Zorad and the statutory provision) it was observed that:
“It is clear from the authorities to which I have referred that it is an essential function of a trial judge in summing-up to a jury that the trial judge, having identified the issue or issues in the trial, put the defence case on that issue or those issues and that the trial judge make such references to the evidence as may be required to enable the jury properly to understand the defence case and that it is not sufficient for the trial judge to say to the jury that they should give consideration to the arguments which have been put by counsel.” [at 147].
See Jade Law for more information on recent Australian and New South Wales case law.
11 women and 20 men joined the Victorian barrister ranks after completing the Bar Readers’ Course, taking the total number of barristers in Victoria from 1875 to 1906. The newly-appointed barristers come from a range of employment backgrounds and include a speechwriter, a television scriptwriter and an event manager.
Full article from Lawyers Weekly here.
In a case before the Local Court of New South Wales we successfully applied to the court for the dismissal of an application for an Apprehended Violence Order being litigated by NSW Police Prosecutors on behalf of an officer who had applied for the AVO.
We acted for a step-father who the Police had taken an AVO against purportedly on behalf of two very-young children. The basis of the AVO were allegations made to the Police by the maternal grandmother of the children who. This triggered an investigation that went on for a number of weeks, during which time the children’s parents not only did not know where their children were, they had to make an urgent application to the Court for orders to have the children returned.
Despite an apparently exhaustive investigation by Police (including interviewing the children without their parents consent) nothing further came of the matter. No criminal charges were bought against the parents and no evidence was provided supporting the original AVO or the subsequent conduct by Police of the matter.
On the final time the matter was before the court, Police Prosecutors said that they had no instructions from the Police Officer in Charge of the investigation (commonly referred to as an “OIC”) yet they sought to have the matter set down for a hearing.
We successfully petitioned on behalf of our client that the AVO should be dismissed for want of prosecution by the NSW Police. We made submissions to the court that the conduct of Police in failing to properly prosecute the matter combined with their lack of instructions and their stated desire to see the matter proceed to a hearing nonetheless amounted to misconduct or was at the very least improper use of court process.
The court noting the history of the matter and a previous Magistrates order that there be no further adjournments, dismissed the application on the spot.
This week in Wollongong Local Court, Magistrate Michael Stoddart refused to order that the prosecution pay the legal costs of a man who Police had bought an AVO against only to have it dismissed after they couldn’t get any evidence or information from the Police.
The AVO had been bought by Police who had been convinced in January 2012 by the man’s estranged mother-in-law that his step children needed protection from him. Despite the children being interviewed by Police and the matter apparently being investigated, no charges were laid and no evidence provided in relation to the AVO. Three months of trying to defend his name and reputation later, the Court dismissed the AVO because the Police had no instructions or evidence and could not take the matter further.
In my opinion, it is proper that in cases such as this, the Police pay the costs that they have put a private citizen to. In this case, Magistrate Stoddart judged that nothing in the conduct of Police was improper or unreasonable nor was the case in any way exceptional and so declined to order that Police have to pay the costs.
That a person can be put to enormous financial expense by Police only to have the whole thing dismissed is bad enough. That a court could think such circumstances might not be exceptional is even worse.